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Abstract: 
 
In this paper, I revisit my own work (2003a, 2003b, 2009) on interjections and non-
verbal behaviours and build on Blakemore’s (2011) account of the descriptive 
ineffability of expressive meaning. Whilst I agree with Blakemore’s claim that 
expressives are best explained through an analysis that uses, on the one hand,  
procedural meaning, and, on the other, the idea that they show one’s emotions, 
rather than meanNN anything in the Gricean sense, I ask two questions by way of 
developing the account further. Firstly, what is the relationship between the 
procedural meaning in Blakemore’s account of expressives and the kind encoded by 
discourse connectives? Secondly, to what extent do we want to say that expressives 
mean anything at all?  In answering these questions I aim to shed light on what 
expressive meaning is, and how it works. 
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 “Fuck off” doesn’t mean “go away” […] There is no English equivalent for “fuck off”’. 
                       Billy Connolly 2005 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
No one with a serious interest in the study of meaning dismisses insights from 
truth-conditional semantic theories. The link between knowing the truth-
conditions of an utterance and understanding the meaning of the sentence 
uttered remains perhaps the key insight in the study of linguistic meaning. 
However, an interesting challenge to the approach is posed by the existence of a 
range of patently meaningful linguistic expressions that make no contribution to 
the truth conditions of the utterances that contain them.  
 
Consider, for example, the emboldened phrase in (1): 
 
(1)  That bloody so-and-so has retired. 
 
‘That bloody so-and-so’ clearly communicates something over and above merely 
identifying a referent. And whatever this something is, it does not seem to be a 
part of the proposition expressed by an utterance of (1), which is equivalent to 
that expressed by (2): 
 
(2)  She has retired. 
 
And while (3) might be an appropriate response to (1), (4) would not: 
  
(3)  That’s not true: she’s just on a sabbatical.  
(4)  That’s not true: she’s not a bloody so-and-so. 
 
The emboldened expressions in (5)-(7) below represent further examples of non-
truth conditional meaning:  
 
(5)  She may have retired but I doubt we've seen the last of her. 
(6)  She’s moved to The Peak District, they say. 
(7)  Frankly, we were all hoping she’d go back to Wellington 
 
A number of different frameworks have been devised within which non-truth-
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conditional expressions can be analyzed. Most of these involve separating non-
truth-conditional from truth-conditional content. In the account proposed by Grice 
(1967, 1989), 'but' does not contribute to what is said in an utterance of (5); 
instead, it conventionally implicates non-truth conditional information about a 
particular relationship between the two conjoined propositions. For Urmson 
(1958: 495-496), parentheticals (see (6)) are ‘not part of the statement made, […] 
but function with regard to a statement made rather as READ WITH CARE 
functions in relation to a subjoined notice’. According to the standard speech act 
account (see Searle 1965; 1969 Bach and Harnish 1979), illocutionary adverbials 
such as 'frankly' in (7) pattern with parentheticals. They do not form part of the 
descriptive content: they indicate the performance of a particular illocutionary act. 
 
But what sets the non-truth-conditional meaning in (1) apart from the other 
examples above is the fact that the noun phrase in (1) contributes information 
about the emotional state of the speaker (Kaplan 1999; Potts 2005, 2007ab, 
2008; Blakemore 2011). Moreover, this information is expressed directly rather 
than described. Compare the direct expression of emotion in (8) with the 
description of it in (9):  
 
(8) Damn! That’s really annoying. 
(9) I’m cross. That’s really annoying. 
 
The primary interjection3 in (10) and the emotional intonational contour in (11) 
(uttered in a high key with high falls on the nuclei ‘loved’ and ‘thank’ – 
represented by ⑊) also convey expressive meaning: 
 
(10) Wow, this book is really interesting! 
(11) ̄ She ⑊loved the o	  toy | ̄ ⑊Thank you | 
 
In this paper, I build on previous accounts of expressive meaning, paying 
particular attention to an account I have developed myself (2003ab, 2009), and 
work by Blakemore (2011, 2013). In doing so, I focus on three particular 
properties expressives seem to share. The first of these is that it follows from 
their non-truth-conditionality that they contribute to speaker meaning in a manner 
that is somehow independent from the utterance(s) in which they appear. In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A primary interjection is an expression that cannot be used in any sense other than as an interjection, e.g. 
wow, oops, ouch; primary interjections are contrasted with secondary interjections, words such as hell, shit, 
damn, which have an established, and separate linguistic meaning but can be used as interjections (see (8) 
above – the secondary interjections hell and shit would work equally well in this example). 
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sense they pattern with the emboldened expressions in (5), (6) and (7). The 
second is that the kind of meaning they convey is extremely difficult to pin down: 
just what does ‘bloody so-and-so’ mean? To use a term adopted in Potts 
(2007a), expressive meaning is ‘descriptively ineffable’, a point succinctly 
illustrated by the Billy Connolly epigraph above. The final shared property is that 
while expressive meaning is often conveyed by non-linguistic means (see (10) 
and (11) above) even linguistic expressives (such as those in (1) and (8)) have a 
flavor of the non-linguistic about them. As I say above, they are used to convey 
emotion directly (cf. (10) and (11)) rather than merely report it: this needs to be 
explained. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I provide a brief overview 
of the relevance-theoretic approach to utterance interpretation; this provides the 
backdrop against which much of the discussion below takes place. In §3, I 
present a historical overview of expressive meaning and a summary of some of 
the explanatory accounts offered in linguistics and the philosophy of language. In 
§4 and §5 I summarise my own (2003) account of interjections, those partly 
natural, partly conventional semi-words that are paradigm examples of 
expressive meaning, and Blakemore’s (2011) account of the descriptive 
ineffability of expressive meaning, looking in particular at the crucial difference 
between the descriptive ineffability of the emboldened expressions in (5) and (1). 
Both my account of interjections and Blakemore’s (2011) account of expressives 
are composites of two separate elements: 
 
I. The relevance-theoretic notion of procedural meaning, itself developed 
originally by Blakemore (1987, 2002); 
II. The continuum between showing and non-natural meaning (meaningNN) first 
introduced in Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) and developed in Wharton 
(2003ab, 2009). 
 
§4 deals with element I, and §5 with element II. Then, in §6 and §7 I extend 
the account by addressing the questions I introduce in my abstract: Firstly, 
what is the relationship between the procedural meaning in Blakemore’s 
account of expressives and the kind encoded by discourse connectives? 
Secondly, to what extent do we want to say that expressives mean anything 
at all? 
 
2. Relevance theory 
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2.1 The cognitive and communicative principles 
Relevance theory (Blakemore 2002; Carston 2002; Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 2004, 2012) is built around two principles: the 
Cognitive and Communicative Principles of Relevance. Relevance itself is a 
property of inputs to cognitive processes, and is defined in terms of positive 
cognitive effects gained and processing effort expended: other things being 
equal, the more positive cognitive effects gained, and the less processing effort 
expended in gaining those effects, the greater the relevance of the input to the 
individual who processes it. 
According to the First, or Cognitive, Principle of Relevance, human cognition 
tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance. As a result of constant 
selection pressure towards increasing cognitive efficiency, humans have 
developed automatic procedures for picking out potentially relevant inputs to 
cognitive processes (e.g. sights, sounds, utterances, memories, conclusions of 
inferences) and processing them in the most productive way (cf. Sperber 1994; 
Wilson and Sperber 2002). These procedures are ‘fast and frugal heuristics’ in 
the sense of Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group (1999). 
According to the Second, or Communicative, Principle of Relevance, an 
utterance or other ostensive act creates a presumption of relevance not created 
by ordinary inputs. While ordinary inputs (sights, sounds, memories, conclusions) 
carry no particular guarantee of relevance, the addressee of an ostensive act is 
entitled to presume that it will be relevant enough to be worth his attention, and to 
look for an interpretation on which it satisfies this presumption. In a relevance-
oriented cognitive system, we might therefore expect the task of identifying a 
communicator’s meaning to be facilitated by the development of an automatic 
comprehension procedure. In recent work, relevance theorists have been 
exploring the idea that the following procedure is automatically applied to the on-
line processing of attended verbal inputs (Sperber 2000; Sperber and Girotto 
2003; Sperber and Wilson 2002; Wilson and Sperber 2002; Wilson and Sperber 
2012): 
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure 
(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects. Consider interpretations 
(e.g. disambiguations, reference resolutions, contextual assumptions, implicatures) 
in order of accessibility. 
(b) Stop when your expectation of relevance is satisfied. 
A hearer using this procedure in interpreting an utterance should (a) pay attention 
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to perceptually salient aspects of the input; (b) consider the most accessible 
disambiguations, reference resolutions, contextual assumptions, implicatures, 
speech-act descriptions, etc.; (c) assume that any extra processing effort 
demanded will be offset by extra or different cognitive effects; (d) stop when he 
has enough cognitive effects to satisfy the particular expectation of relevance 
raised by the utterance. Those effects will come in a range of different forms and 
from a range of different sources. 
2.2 Strong and weak communication  
Sperber and Wilson’s framework builds on the foundations Grice laid in his 
seminal 1957 paper ‘Meaning’. In that paper Grice proposed an account in which 
meaning was to be understood in terms of propositional-attitude psychology; 
ultimately, the meanings of words reduced to the beliefs, desires and intentions of 
communicators who uttered them. Grice began by drawing a distinction between 
natural meaning (meaningN) (12) and non-natural meaning (meaningNN) (13): 
(12) That black smoke meansN the tyre factory is on fire. 
(13) That white smoke meansNN the Vatican Conclave has elected a new Pontiff. 
 
Grice was not concerned with the kind of meaning inherent in (12)4: the black 
smoke clearly simply provides evidence of a fire (this is sometimes called 
indicator meaning). He focussed his attention instead on cases such as (13), in 
which meaning typically involves a convention or code (itself underpinned by the 
intentions of speakers).5 
Central to Grice’s intentional account of meaning is the observation that in any 
act where a communicator provides evidence of an intention to induce a belief or 
a response, or to inform someone, there are actually two layers of information 
that the audience needs to retrieve. The first, basic layer is the information being 
pointed out; the second, the information that this first layer is being pointed out 
intentionally. Grice’s key insight was that for a case to count as one of meaningNN 
the first, basic layer should not be entirely derivable without reference to the 
second layer (and, furthermore, this should be intended by the communicator).  
This insight lies at the heart of the distinction Grice drew between meaningNN and 
showing, which is discussed in §5 and §7. 
A criticism sometimes levelled at this account is that what is typically 
communicated (or meantNN) is a propositional attitude such as a belief. Recall his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Though I will return to it later in this paper. 
5 For discussion of how the nested intentions of speakers might evolve towards the possibility of coded 
meaning see Grice (1982). 
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original formulation of meaningNN (1957: 384): 
“A meant something by x” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered x with the intention of 
 inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention” (my italics – TW). 
But communicators do not always aim at inducing beliefs in their audiences. So, 
to help account for the vaguer aspects of communication, including the 
communication of impressions, emotions, attitudes, feelings and sensations, 
Sperber and Wilson argue that communicators do not intend to modify a hearer’s 
thoughts directly, but rather his cognitive environment. 
An individual’s cognitive environment includes not only all the facts or 
assumptions that he is currently aware of, but also all the facts or assumptions he 
is capable of becoming aware of given his cognitive abilities and his physical 
environment – in relevance-theoretic terms, the set of facts or assumptions that 
are manifest to him (i.e. that he is capable of perceiving or inferring). The notion 
of manifestness plays a central role in the relevance-theoretic characterisation of 
an informative intention, which is defined not in Gricean terms, as an intention ‘to 
produce a belief that p’ but rather as an intention ‘to make manifest or more 
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I’ (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 
58). 
An assumption may be manifest to different degrees. The more salient a manifest 
assumption is, and hence the more likely to be mentally represented, the more 
strongly manifest it is. Vague communication typically involves an intention to 
bring about a marginal increase in the manifestness of a very wide range of 
assumptions that are weakly manifest in the cognitive environments of both 
communicator and audience, resulting in an increased degree of similarity or 
mutuality between them. Indeed, the mutual cognitive environment of two people 
engaged in communication is constantly calibrated, refined and readjusted by 
what Lieberman (2000: 123) calls ‘the dance of non-verbal communication’. 
The array of assumptions I a communicator intends to make (more or less) 
manifest may take many different forms. Consider the examples in (14), (15) and 
(16): 
(14) A: How’s work going? 
 B: The boss is a bastard! 
(15) A: How’s work going? 
 B: (Sighs wearily) 
(16) A’s colleague, who works on the next desk, catches A’s eye, sits back and 
sighs. 
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B’s response in (14) is very direct and her message absolutely clear; in (15) it is 
less so, and in (16) what A’s colleague is communicating is very vague indeed.  
Relevance theory captures the differences between these cases by 
distinguishing strong from weak communication, and strong from weak 
implicatures. A conclusion is strongly implicated to the extent that it (or some 
closely similar proposition) must be derived in the course of constructing a 
satisfactory interpretation: in this case the array of assumptions I contains a 
single, strongly manifest, assumption. It is weakly implicated if its recovery helps 
with the construction of a satisfactory interpretation, but is not essential because 
the array of assumptions I contains a wide array of roughly similar conclusions, 
which are all made weakly manifest (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: chapter 1, 
sections 10-12, chapter 4, section 6; Sperber and Wilson (forthcoming)). So while 
the sigh in (15) quite strongly implicates that all is not well at work, the sigh in 
(16) makes weakly manifest a wide array of weak implicatures: that is, it creates 
an impression rather than conveying a definite message. 
Wharton (2009) argues that those working in pragmatics cannot, as many 
generative grammarians have done, simply abstract away from everything that 
does not form part of the linguistic code. The aim of a pragmatic theory is to 
explain how utterances are understood, and utterances, of course, have both 
linguistic and non-linguistic properties. Also, the emotional dimension to speaker 
meaning (if speaker meaning is the right term, see Sperber (2014) and Sperber 
and Wilson (forthcoming)) is at least as important, sometimes more important, 
than those dimensions that tend to receive more attention: any pragmatic theory 
worth its salt simply must have a view on how non-verbal communicative 
behaviours contribute to speakers’ meanings. This, I argue, involves accounting 
for weak as well as strong communication and, as we shall see later, returning to 
Grice’s notion of natural meaning, briefly introduced in this section. 
 
3. Expressive meaning 
The analysis of the expressive or emotional dimensions of linguistic meaning has 
certainly tended to play a secondary role to the descriptive, cognitive or rational 
ones. But that has not always been the case. Foolen (1997: 17) notes that in the 
early 1900s, linguists such as Erdman (1900), Bally (1905, 1910), van Ginneken 
(1907) and Sperber (1914) criticised the ‘strongly ideational orientation’ of the 
semantics that dominated at the time, suggesting instead that the study of the 
expressive, emotional side of semantics might be at least as important a field of 
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study as the cognitive, rational one. Van Ginneken, in fact, went further, 
proposing that rational meaning had its roots in emotional meaning. The idea, 
however, never really caught on and as Foolen notes, Sapir took severe 
exception to this view: ‘[I]deation reigns supreme in language […] volition and 
emotion come in as distinctly secondary factors’ (1921: 40). Perhaps due, at least 
in part, to the efforts of those mentioned above, early 20th century linguists at 
least acknowledged the emotional function of language. Bühler (1934) contrasted 
the conceptualising function, Darstellungsfunktion, with Ausdruck, the emotional 
one. Influenced by Bühler, Jakobson (1960) recognised six functions of language 
or communication, one of which was the expressive/emotive function, which 
served not to alter the descriptive content of an utterance but rather to express 
the internal state of the speaker.  
 
In the early and mid-twentieth century, however, the most common approach to 
the analytic philosophy of language remained the ‘ideal’ language philosophy of 
Russell, Frege, Tarski and later the ‘logical positivists’ led by Carnap. This was a 
highly formal approach, which explored natural language using logical and 
mathematical languages such as propositional logic and predicate calculus. 
Central to ideal language philosophy were the notions of truth, falsity and ‘truth-
conditions’. Reacting to this approach, and focusing on the illocutionary, rather 
than the truth-conditional, descriptive content of an utterance, Austin’s How to Do 
to Things with Words (1962) puts the social functions of language at the center of 
its analysis. Meaning, Austin argued, can’t be reduced to truth because many 
sentences both in the language of philosophy and in everyday language aren’t 
intended to be true or false; approaching them from the perspective of truth is 
therefore to misunderstand what they’re doing. Indeed, the conclusion to his 
argument is that all utterances are performative rather than constative. Following 
in Austin’s footsteps, Searle (1969) defined expressive speech acts as those acts 
in which the illocutionary force is to express the speaker’s own psychological 
state. 
  
But not all the interesting work on expressive meaning has been done by non-
formalists. Kaplan (1999) addresses the linguistic difference between ‘I feel 
pain’ and ouch. Well known for his work on indexicals, he remarks on the 
similarities between indexicals on the one hand, and expressives 
(interjections - ouch, oops) and epithets on the other: all these expressions, 
he claims, are better analyzed in terms of a Semantics of Use rather than (or 
as well as) a Semantics of Meaning. To account for the difference between ‘I 
feel pain’ and ouch, he introduces his distinction between descriptive (truth-
conditional/propositional) content and expressive (non-truth-conditional/non-
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propositional) content. This distinction is similar to the distinction drawn by 
speech-act theorists between describing and indicating mentioned above and 
elements of it have informed my own work on interjections. For Kaplan, one of 
the reasons that ouch and ‘I feel pain’ are not synonymous is that while ‘I feel 
pain’ has descriptive meaning, ouch has expressive meaning. In Kaplan’s 
terms, the modes of expression are different.  
 
Like Kaplan, Potts' main aim is to integrate expressive meaning within a 
formal semantic framework. Indeed, his 2007a paper begins with an epigraph 
from Kaplan (1999):  
 
 [I]t seems to me quite possible to extend semantic methods [. . . ] to a range  
 of expressions that have been regarded as falling outside semantics, and   
 perhaps even as being insusceptible to formalization.  
Potts (2005) formulates a ‘descriptive logic’ for Gricean conventional implicatures 
and then shows how his framework can deal with, among other phenomena, 
expressive meaning. The effect of an utterance of the damn dog leads to the 
propositional entailment 'bad (the dog)' in a separate dimension (‘the expressive 
dimension’). Whilst in subsequent work the account offered by Potts is subtly 
changed, the formalist approach remains. So, according to Potts (2007a), an 
utterance of the damn dog does not lead to any propositional entailment, but 
instead contributes to an expressive ‘index’, itself part of the ‘context’, 
emphasising the role played by expressives in ‘pragmatic inference and 
discourse structure’. There have been some interesting responses to Potts’ 
works. I remark briefly on one of these, Bach (2006), in §7. The main aim here, 
however, is to build on Blakemore’s (2011) account. She argues, with Potts, that 
expressives are indeed descriptively ineffable but against the kind of formalist 
analysis he offers. In the next section I introduce my own account of interjections 
and then turn to the account offered in Blakemore’s (2011) paper in more detail. 
 
4. Expressives, ineffability and procedural meaning 
4.1 Interjections and concepts 
Historically, interjections have been treated in two different ways: as part of 
language, or as non-words (or even semi-words, see Goffman 1981) that signify 
feelings or states of mind. Wharton (2003a) assesses two contemporary 
approaches that reflect the historical dichotomy, and suggests an analysis that 
preserves the insights of both. In the opening section of the paper, I propose a 
range of arguments against claims made in previous work by proponents of what 
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I refer to as the ‘conceptualist’ view (Ameka 1992, Wilkins 1992, Wierzbicka 
1992, 1996, 2000), the view under which interjections encode complex, 
decompositional conceptual structures such as the one in (17): 
 
(17)  
 “ow!” 
I suddenly feel a pain (in this part of my body) right now that I 
wouldn’t have expected to feel. 
I say ‘[au]’ because I want to show that I am feeling pain right 
now [and because I know that this is how speakers of English can 
show (other speakers of English) that they are in pain (in a situation 
like the situation here)] 
 
I won’t rehearse all the arguments here, but three of them mentioned in Wharton 
(2003a) are particularly pertinent to the issues being discussed in this paper 
insofar as they directly reflect those properties introduced in §1 as shared by 
expressives. Firstly, consider utterances of (18) and (19): 
 
(18) I’m in pain! That hit me! 
(19) Ouch! That hit me! 
 
A speaker of (18) makes two assertions: it is true when the speaker is in pain and 
when they have been hit by something. By contrast, a speaker of (19) is making 
only a single assertion: it is true if and only if they have been hit by something. A 
person hearing (19) could not object: ‘You’re lying! You’re not in pain’.6 Given the 
discussion so far, this much is not surprising. Interjections such as ouch express 
pain rather than describing it.  
 
If ouch does encode a concept, and one that forms part of the proposition 
expressed by an utterance, one would expect intuitions of a synonymy between 
(20) and (21) below: 
 
(20) I’m in pain! I’m in pain! 
(21) Ouch! I’m in pain! 
 
But while (20) intuitively involves a conceptual repetition, (21) does not (and 
overlooks entirely the distinction between expressing and describing). In short, 
interjections seem to function in a way that is separate to the conceptual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See earlier discussion of (4) and (1). 
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structures around them. 
 
Secondly, what is conveyed by an interjection is highly context-dependent, which 
suggests a substantial pragmatic contribution to their comprehension, one that is 
not captured by the rigid structure in (17), and is also descriptively ineffable. 
Utterances of wow or aha, particularly when they function as stand-alone 
utterances, might convey a vast range of different emotional states, each of 
which is hard to describe independently of their context of use. Finally, the 
conceptualist approach overlooks the fact that interjections share with certain 
non-verbal behaviours the property of being partly natural and partly coded. 
Another analysis is needed. 
 
One possibility that has recently been explored is what while the conceptualist 
account discussed above is hugely problematic, interjections might still have 
some conceptual content. Walaszewska (2004) and Padilla Cruz (2009a) argue 
that instead of encoding the rigid structure in (17) interjections encode some 
quite general, vague concept that subsequently needs inferential adjustment. 
Perhaps, they also suggest, there might exist something like a cline, along which 
interjections can be shown to encode more or less conceptual content. I return to 
these arguments in §6, but turn firstly to the account I originally developed 
(2003a) as a response to the conceptualist view.  
 
4.2 Procedural meaning 
 
Blakemore (1987, 2002) reassesses the Gricean account of discourse 
connectives within a relevance-theoretic framework by introducing a distinction 
between conceptual and procedural encoding. Most words encode concepts, 
constituents of conceptual representations. Most of these contribute to the truth-
conditions of an utterance; they have logical properties, can act as input to 
inference rules, and are used to describe the world. Some words, however, do 
not map onto concepts. Rather than encoding the constituents of conceptual 
representations, the function of these words in Blakemore’s view is to constrain 
the inferential processes involved in constructing or manipulating these 
representations. They guide the comprehension process by narrowing the 
hearer’s search space and indicating the general direction in which the intended 
meaning is to be sought. There are a vast number of possible cognitive effects 
the speaker might have had in mind, and since processing effort is a factor in 
achieving relevance, such expressions will contribute to relevance by reducing 
the hearer’s effort in finding the intended effects. 
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Consider Blakemore’s analyses of the discourse connectives ‘so’ and ‘after all’. 
Two possible interpretations of (22) would be spelled out more explicitly in (23) or 
(24): 
 
(22) She reads Katherine Mansfield all day long. She’s retired. 
(23) She reads Katherine Mansfield all day long; after all, she’s retired. 
(24) She reads Katherine Mansfield all day long; so she’s retired. 
 
On Blakemore’s account, in (23) the expression ‘after all’ encodes a procedure 
which leads to the second proposition being understood as evidence for the first.  
In (24) the word ‘so’ encodes a procedure which leads the hearer to process the 
two propositions in such a way that the first is a premise from which the second 
follows as a conclusion. Blakemore’s analysis classifies them as examples of 
procedural expressions constraining inference at an implicit level. Wilson and 
Sperber (1993) extend this analysis to pronouns, mood indicators and discourse 
particles, which they see as examples of procedural expressions constraining the 
construction of explicatures.7 
 
4.3 Interjections, procedures and natural codes  
 
Wharton (2003a) argues that interjections share with discourse connectives and 
discourse particles the property of encoding procedural rather than conceptual 
information. On this approach, the function of an interjection such as wow might 
be to facilitate the retrieval of a range of speech-act or propositional-attitude 
descriptions associated with expressions of surprise or delight. These in turn 
might be narrowed in context by information derived from prosody, facial 
expressions, background assumptions, discourse context etc., and contribute to 
the speaker’s meaning in the regular way, by falling under the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension procedure. In a different context, as a stand-alone utterance, it 
might marginally alter the strength or salience of a wide array of conclusions 
rather than providing strong support for a single, determinate conclusion. If so, it 
will communicate weakly and create an impression. 
 
Padilla Cruz (2009b) extends a version of this analysis to so-called 
conative/volitive interjections, which speakers use to express desires and 
intentions rather than emotions. So when hey! or oi! is uttered by a mother to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In relevance theory terminology the basic level explicature is equivalent to the proposition expressed in an 
utterance. See fn. 6 for further types of explicature. 
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prevent a child from touching an object that is fragile and valuable, such as a 
vase, the procedural information encoded by the interjection is pointing to some 
assumptions that need to be made manifest to him in order that he infer she 
wants him not to do something. I agree with Padilla Cruz that this idea opens a 
path well worth exploring. 
 
The argument originally proposed in Wharton (2003a) is taken further in Wharton 
(2003b) and (2009), where it is proposed that smiles and other natural, 
spontaneous facial expressions are natural codes, which should be analysed as 
encoding procedural rather than conceptual information. The idea that facial 
expressions might be coded has its roots in the ethological literature. Hauser 
(1996) applies a distinction between signs and signals to cases of information 
transmission among animals. Signs carry information by providing evidence for it. 
Signals, on the other hand, are those behaviours that convey information and 
have been ‘moulded by natural selection to do so’ (Seeley 1989: 547). As 
Brandon (2005) puts it: ‘if an adaptation is a product of the process of evolution 
by natural selection…then these things are adaptations. And so, I claim, they 
have functions. Their functions are their effects that make them adaptively 
superior to the trait variants with which they compete’. Put differently, the 
adaptive function of a behaviour is the effect which is historically responsible for 
the reproduction and propagation of that behaviour within a species (Millikan 
1984, Origgi and Sperber 2000, Sperber 2007). 
The distinction between natural signs and signals in the human case can be 
illustrated by comparing shivering with smiling. Shivering is a natural behaviour 
whose function is to generate heat by rapid muscle movement. It may provide 
evidence to an observer that the individual is feeling cold. However, it is not its 
function to carry this information: it is not a signal but a sign. Smiling, by contrast, 
appears to have evolved as a signalling activity whose function is to convey 
information to others (van Hooff 1972; Ekman and Rosenberg 1987; Ekman 
1989, 1992, 1994, 1999; Fridlund 1994). As Ekman, puts it, smiling and other 
spontaneous facial expressions ‘have been selected and refined over the course 
of evolution for their role in social communication’ (1999: 51). Like the bee dance 
and the bullfrog calls, they are signals rather than signs. 
If some natural behaviours are coded signals, we would predict that they are 
interpreted by specialised, perhaps dedicated, neural machinery. This prediction 
appears to be borne out: both non-human primates and humans have neural 
mechanisms dedicated both to recognising faces and to processing facial 
expressions (Gazzaniga and Smiley 1991). Moreover, human neonates appear 
able to distinguish basic facial expressions of emotion, a fact which provides 
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more support for the view that their interpretation is governed by innately-
determined codes (Field et al. 1982; Phillips et al. 1990; Nelson and de Haan 
1996). 
On this approach, the function of facial expressions of surprise or delight would 
be to facilitate the retrieval of similar, strongly communicated propositional-
attitude descriptions to those activated by the interjection wow, or, again, weakly 
implicated assumptions along the lines of the account sketched in §2.2. If 
linguistic and non-linguistic expressives encode procedural meaning, this at least 
goes some way to explaining why the former have the flavour of the latter. 
 
4.5 Expressives and procedures 
The notion of ‘procedure’ developed in Wharton (2009) is, on the face of it, a very 
different one to that originally proposed in Blakemore (1987, 2002). Nonetheless, 
having seen her original distinction extended somewhat, Blakemore (2011) 
embraces the changes and uses them in her own account of expressive 
meaning. 
 
The paper begins with a review of the linguistic semantic account of expressive 
meaning proposed in Potts (2005, 2007ab, 2008). When it comes to expressive 
meaning there is, it transpires, a great deal of common ground between Potts 
and Blakemore. Recall once more the three properties expressives share: the 
independence of expressive meaning from the proposition expressed; its 
descriptive ineffability; the non-verbal flavour of linguistic expressives. Potts 
recognises all three of these: (i) As Blakemore points out, according to Potts, 
‘there is a “disconnect” between the expressive and the sentence that houses it’ 
(2011: 3543); (ii) The notion of ‘descriptive ineffability’, the idea that the meaning 
of expressives is hard to pin down in conceptual terms, is central to Potts’ 
account: in a large number of interviews and surveys reported in Potts (2007a) 
bastard was only defined by one person as a ‘vile, contemptible person’, and 
while people will happily explain that such words are used to express feelings or 
vent emotions, pinning down exactly what they mean is much harder to do; (iii) 
Potts does indeed recognise that there are parallels between linguistic 
expressives and natural, non-verbal behaviours of the kind that typically signal 
expressive information. 
 
However, that is where the similarities between the two accounts end. Blakemore 
takes issue with the formal approach to expressive meaning adopted by Potts. 
And while Potts’ account offers some interesting insights, it is hard to disagree 
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with Blakemore that his notion of an emotional setting is ‘a rather one-
dimensional approach to the range of emotional attitudes and states which can 
be communicated by an expressive’ (Blakemore 2011: 3543). Perhaps instead of 
analyzing expressives as contributing to expressive ‘indices’ or ‘contexts’, we 
might be better to re-interpret his work in cognitive terms and explore what kind 
of processes they actually activate. 
Blakemore’s solution is to invoke her own notion of procedural meaning: 
Like discourse markers, these expressions correspond to procedures for 
interpretation. However, in contrast with discourse markers, they activate 
procedures for retrieving representations of emotional states. 
She goes on (2013: 3544): 
[U]sed expressively, damn, bastard and shit are not understood to encode 
concepts which are pragmatically enriched in different ways in different contexts... 
Thus used, these words play a role in the communication of a speaker’s emotions 
by corresponding to a procedure for retrieving representations rather than a 
constituent of a propositional representation.  
The similarity, and essential difference, between the non-truth-conditional 
phenomena in (1) and (6) is thus explained. However, there is still more to be 
said about what precisely these procedures for retrieving representations of 
emotional states actually are. Before turning to that issue in §6, I present the 
second element shared by the analyses offered in Wharton (2003ab, 2009) 
and Blakemore (2011). 
 
5. Expressives, showing and meaningNN 
A further controversial feature of the account of intentional communication 
offered in Grice (1957) is the line he draws between meaningNN and showing. 
Consider (25): 
 
(25) Feeling faint, a girl lets her mother see how pale she is (hoping that 
she may draw her own conclusions and help). 
 
In this example, Grice’s M-intention – the higher-order intention that an intention 
to convey a particular piece of information is not only recognised, but also plays a 
role in the audience inferring that piece of information – is largely redundant. The 
fact that the little girl is pale is evidence enough to the mother that she needs 
help: any intentions the little girl might have play no causal role in the mother 
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arriving at the conclusion she reaches. According to Grice, then, the kind of 
intentional communication in (25) does not count as one of meaningNN. 
 
This distinction has had important effects on the evolution of pragmatics since, 
following Grice, pragmatists have focused on the notion of meaningNN , the 
tendency being to abstract away from cases of showing. But the distinction is 
much easier to conceive of than it is actually to apply in communicative 
exchanges. Utterances are complex things. Yes, they involve linguistic 
expressions that clearly do involve non-natural meaning, but there also seem to 
be cases where the open showing of a spontaneously produced natural 
behaviour makes a difference to the speaker’s meaning. To develop an example 
from Wilson and Wharton (2006): 
 
(26)  Jack is late. 
 
If the speaker of (26) utters this sentence while making no attempt to conceal the 
spontaneous anger in her facial expression and tone of voice, then she would 
naturally be understood to mean not only that Jack was late but also that she was 
angry that he was late. Moreover, intended strong implicatures may well depend 
on the audience understanding the degree to which the speaker is angry, itself 
indicated by the amount of anger indexed by his tone of voice: the speaker may 
be largely apathetic, and just not prepared to wait for Jack any longer; or she 
may be incandescent with rage, because this is absolutely the last straw. Weak 
implicatures may depend on it too. 
 
The framework drawn up by Grice excludes such spontaneous expressions of 
anger from contributing to a speaker’s meaning. But expressive meaning is 
typically communicated in this natural way and relevance theorists have 
consistently argued that there is a continuum of cases between showing and 
meaningNN, all of which may fall within the domain of pragmatics and contribute 
to a speaker’s meaning (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: chapter 1, section 10, 
Sperber and Wilson (forthcoming)). Wharton (2009) presents a defence of this 
view. 
 
While Potts (2007ab) restricts his discussion of expressives to secondary 
interjections such as damn and bastard, he does, as remarked earlier, compare 
the descriptive ineffability of expressives with the descriptive ineffability of non-
verbal behaviours such as facial expressions. However, without broadening the 
domain of pragmatics, and without extending it beyond strict Gricean meaningNN, 
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it is genuinely hard to see how any such parallels can be made to work. Grice 
was happy for faked, deliberate frowns to meanNN, provided that whatever the 
frown means cannot be derived independently of the intentions behind showing 
it, and presumably an account along those lines could be developed for non-
spontaneous utterances of damn. But to do this misses the spontaneity of cases 
of expressive meaning, and their cathartic nature. Recognising that the domain of 
pragmatics should not just be restricted to cases of meaningNN and embracing all 
cases of overt intentional communication, including those Grice would have 
classified as showing, is the only way they can be captured. 
 
As well as being inspired by the relevance-theoretic showing-meaningNN 
continuum, the analysis of interjections offered in Wharton (2003a) was partly 
inspired by a section in Goffman’s famous paper ‘Response Cries’ in Goffman 
(1981), in which he suggests that there may be a continuum between the 
properly linguistic and the non-linguistic, or between display (or showing) and 
saying: ‘[R]esponse cries such as eek! might be seen as peripheral to the 
linguist’s domain […] but imprecations […] are more germane, passing beyond 
semi-word segregates to the traditional material of linguistic analysis’ (1981: 
121). 
 
A feature of interjections is that they express attitudes, so utterances of (27a) and 
(28a) might lead a hearer to embed the proposition expressed under attitudinal 
descriptions such as in (27b) and (28b). In relevance theory these would be 
higher-level explicatures:8 
 
(27a)  Aha! You’re here. 
(27b)  The speaker is surprised that I am here. 
(28a) Wow! You’re here. 
(28b) The speaker is delighted that I am here. 
 
In the stand-alone use of the interjection wow in (29) the speaker shows how 
they feel, rather than describes it (as in (30)). The interjection makes weakly 
manifest a wide array of weak implicatures:  
(29)  Wow! 
(30)  I am delighted. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In relevance theoretic terminology, a higher-order explicature is a representation in which the basic level 
explicature (the proposition expressed) is embedded under a speech-act or propositional-attitude 
description. Compare with the speech-act distinction between describing and indicating outlined in §1. 
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Blakemore proposes a similar analysis of the difference between (31) and (32) 
and this analysis can be extended to cover the emotional tone of voice in 
example (26) above: 
 
(31)  I am angry! 
(32)  Damn! 
 
Interjections, Wharton (2003a) concludes, are partly natural and partly coded. 
They fall at various points along a continuum between display and language 
proper, or showing and meaningNN. In one way interjections offer fairly direct 
evidence of the basic layer of information being communicated but their partly 
coded nature makes them less direct than, say, completely spontaneous, natural 
sounds.9 The continuum also allows us to capture the heterogeneity and 
marginal linguistic status of the class in general and makes it relatively easy to 
see how a given expression (e.g. an interjection) might move along the 
continuum from ‘non-linguistic’ to ‘partly linguistic’ to ‘linguistic’ without radically 
altering the type of information it conveys. Seeing interjections in this way, we 
should not be surprised either at their descriptive ineffability, or the fact that what 
they convey is sometimes too nebulous to be paraphrased in determinate 
conceptual terms: they are partly natural responses. Expressing emotion is more 
about showing than it is about meaningNN. 
 
6. Procedural meaning and emotion 
Procedural meaning was originally conceived to deal with the kind of non-truth-
conditional discourse connectives that Grice had analysed as conveying 
conventional implicatures (see (5) above). Indeed, in this respect, there is 
something interestingly cyclical to note about the relationship between the 
procedural account of expressives offered here and Potts’ account of expressives 
as communicating conventional implicatures. 
Extending procedural meaning to the analysis of interjections was not an entirely 
uncontroversial move. The main objection was that expressions such as ‘but’ and 
ouch, have little in common. And in a way, of course, that’s right. ‘But’ is 
uncontroversially a word, a part of language; ‘ouch’ enjoys marginal linguistic 
status at best. However, they do share interesting properties. Indeed, ‘but’ shares 
with expressives two of the properties I have been focusing on in this paper. Like 
expressives, ‘but’ is a non-truth-conditional indicator. It is also descriptively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Compare, for example, ouch with aaaaaaaaaaaaargh! 
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ineffable. Experience with students has taught me that when people try to define 
the meaning of ‘but’, they typically say how it is used; much as they do with, say, 
the expressive ‘bastard’. Nonetheless, it is clear that the kind of procedure 
encoded by ‘but’ does seem to be a very different type to that encoded by ouch. 
In a recent paper that explores the past, present and future of procedural 
meaning, Deirdre Wilson (2011) discusses the function of the kind of procedures 
encoded by discourse connectives such as ‘but’. Originally, it was thought that 
such procedures existed in order to make inferential communication easier: to 
guide the hearer’s path. However, building on Sperber et al’s (2010) work on 
‘epistemic vigilance’ – those cognitive strategies by which hearers avoid being 
either accidentally or intentionally misinformed – she proposes an interesting 
alternative: 
On this new account, the main function of discourse connectives would be not so 
much to guide the comprehension process as to trigger argumentative procedures 
which yield intuitions about evidential relations, and form part of the capacity for 
epistemic vigilance directed at the content of communicated information. 
And goes on: 
The function of the procedural expressions in a language may be to activate […] 
domain-specific procedures. In principle, these could be of any type at all, 
although in practice they are likely to be drawn from modules which play a 
significant role in linguistic communication: these include the modules (or sub-
modules) involved in mindreading (Baron-Cohen, 1995), emotion reading 
(Wharton, 2003, 2009), social cognition (Malle, 2004; Fiske and Taylor, 2008), 
parsing and speech production (Levelt,1993), comprehension (Sperber and 
Wilson 2002) and so on.  
                      Wilson (2011: 17) 
But what precisely are these emotion-reading procedures? This is a question that 
cannot adequately be answered without considering the nature of emotions 
themselves.  
Wharton (2009) presents a view of emotions based largely on the work of 
philosopher Georges Rey (1980). According to that view, full-fledged emotional 
states are distinguished from ‘sensations’ or ‘feelings’ by the fact that they involve 
an interaction between several elements: cognitive, qualitative and physiological. 
So the emotion sadness is characterised as involving an interaction between a 
cognitive element – knowledge, perhaps, that something has happened you 
would prefer not to have happened (or a belief that something you would prefer 
not to happen is about to); a qualitative element – the feeling of being ‘down’, 
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which is typically accompanied by behaviours consistent with feeling this way; 
and a physiological element – neurochemical changes, which, in the case of 
sadness or depression, involves depletion of norepinephrine. Whilst emotional 
states crucially involve cognitive as well as qualitative and physiological 
elements, ‘feelings’ or ‘sensations’ need not. 
A central tenet of Rey’s account is that it embraces the idea that emotion and 
cognition work together. As such, it goes against a tradition – rooted in Cartesian 
dualism – in which cognition and affect are viewed as entirely separate: a 
tradition implicit in the Sapir quote in §3 above and perhaps responsible for the 
fact that expressive dimensions of linguistic meaning have played a secondary 
role to the rational ones.  
In a recent paper that attempts to build interdisciplinary bridges outwards from 
pragmatics, Strey (2015) asks what neuroscience is saying about emotion. The 
results are interesting but, whilst the terminology adopted could not be more 
confusingly different, work on emotion by Damasio (1994) appears to be in a 
similar spirit to that of Rey.10 Indeed, the book in which he presents his main 
thesis is entitled Descartes’ Error. For Damasio, ‘emotions’ are body states (so, 
‘feelings’ or ‘sensations’ in Rey’s terminology) and ‘feelings’ are mental 
representations of those body states (so, in Rey’s terms, ‘emotions’). Crucially, 
however, this interaction between ‘emotions’ and ‘feelings’ is pervasive and, 
indeed, can become a permanent one stored in memory. According to Damasio’s 
‘somatic marker hypothesis’, ‘feelings’ about body states (mental representations 
of physical states) can function to guide inference. 
But there are problems. Firstly, and probably least importantly, Damasio’s 
terminology is bafflingly counter-intuitive. Is ‘feeling’ an emotion really the correct 
term to use to explain that it is being mentally represented? When I use the term 
‘feeling’, I will continue to use it in Rey’s sense. Secondly, and more worryingly, 
as pointed out by Greenspan (and, indeed, recognised by Damasio later in his 
book), Cartesian mind/body is not the correct ‘philosophical foil’ (Greenspan 
2003: 114) for his approach: 
 He [Damasio – TW]) implicitly recognizes, at one point toward the end of the book, 
that his announced target, Descartes cogito, does include emotions, or at any rate 
their mental aspect (‘suffering’), and he [Damasio – TW] cites Descartes’ detailed 
account of emotions in The Passions and the Soul. But Descartes’ explanation of 
emotions in that work in terms of ‘animal spirits’ (essentially an outdated predecessor 
of neurological impulses) seems to bridge body and mind (or soul), despite his official 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I am particularly grateful to Claudia Strey and Ernst-August Gutt for communication and conversations on 
ways in which Damasio’s work might inform relevance theory. 
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dualism. […] The title of both books – Damasio’s and Descartes – may be somewhat 
unfortunate. 
For cognitive scientists such as Leda Cosmides and John Tooby ‘mind’ and 
‘brain’ are two terms that refer to precisely the same thing. The mind is ‘a set of 
information processing procedures (cognitive programs) that are physically 
embodied in the neural circuitry of the brain’ (2000: 97). Put differently, ‘the mind 
is what the brain does’ (ibid.). According to the view they develop, an emotion is 
a kind of superordinate cognitive program, the function of which is to regulate or 
mobilise cognitive sub-programs responsible for perception and attention, goal 
choice, information-gathering, specialised types of inference, physiological 
changes etc. 
An emotion is not reducible to any one category of effects, such as effects on 
physiology, behavioural inclinations, cognitive appraisals, or feeling states, because it 
involves evolved instructions for all of them together, as well as other mechanisms 
distributed throughout the human and mental and physical architecture. 
             (ibid. 93) 
They give the example of fear. Experiencing the emotion of fear an individual is: 
automatically put into a state hyper-alertness, in which they pay a high degree of 
attention to perceptual inputs they may not normally even notice; equipped with a 
newly defined set of goals, in which safety is suddenly the most important of a 
range of new informational priorities – Where is my baby? Where are others that 
can protect me? (ibid. 93); subconsciously directed to different, prioritised 
inferential processes which are activated to aid the making of valuable 
inferences; subject to the kind of physiological changes summarised in the 
discussion of Rey’s notion of sensations. 
If this account is right, then emotions can be seen as procedural heuristics in the 
sense of Gigerenzer et al. (1999), involving the interplay between cognition, on 
the one hand, and feelings (in Rey’s sense) and perhaps even ‘gut feelings’ (in 
the sense of Gigerenzer 2007) on the other. 
Co-evolving with the emotional programs or procedures described above would 
have been emotion-reading programs and procedures. These procedures are 
sub-attentive and unintentional (Lieberman 2000), and will play a role in 
communication, as well as cognition, whether that communication is ostensive or 
non-ostensive. The procedural information encoded by linguistic expressives, 
interjections, facial expressions or tone of voice puts the user into a state in 
which emotional procedures are highly activated, and are therefore much more 
likely to be recognised and selected by an audience using the relevance-theoretic 
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comprehension procedure. Sometimes, in fact, the states themselves may be 
contagious (Hatfield et al. 1994, Dezecache et al. 2013a).  
In recent work, Dezecache et al. (2013b) have argued for a notion of ‘emotional 
vigilance’ related to, but not entirely parallel with, Sperber et al’s epistemic 
vigilance. According to them ‘receivers are endowed with a suite of mechanisms 
designed to modulate their responses to emotional signals’ (2013b: 6). As 
Dezecache et al. concede, a full analysis of precisely what emotional vigilance 
mechanisms involve is beyond the scope of their paper. Part of the answer, 
however, will involve a deeper understanding of not only the relationship between 
ostensive and non-ostensive communication, but also the relationship between 
decoding and inference in the way we read the emotions of others. 
Consider gaze direction. In terms of the distinctions introduced in §4.3 this is a 
natural sign: it merely happens to carry information for an observer. However, the 
potential relevance of this information is such that a relevance-oriented cognitive 
system might well be improved by the development of a special-purpose 
inferential mechanism of this type. Indeed, in the discussion of fear in the 
Cosmides and Tooby paper, inferences drawn from the gaze direction sub-
program are just the kind of inferences that may be prioritised in a dangerous 
situation: if the bear is not looking at me, it may not have seen me. 
Natural codes, however, which facilitate the production and interpretation of 
affective facial expressions or tones of voice in terms of underlying mental states, 
might be seen as automatic emotion-reading mechanisms of a coded rather than 
an inferential nature, dedicated to the interpretation of natural emotional signals 
rather than natural emotional signs. What distinguishes a special-purpose 
inferential mechanism from a coding mechanism is: firstly, that the inferential 
mechanism applies to natural signs rather than signals; secondly, that it is 
genuinely inferential (i.e. it draws warranted conclusions on the basis of 
evidence); thirdly, that it is not part of a signalling system with corresponding 
encoding mechanisms at the production end. Emotional vigilance may make use 
of both specialised inferential and coding-decoding mechanisms.  
One final point, also raised in Wilson (2011), concerns the question of whether 
linguistic and non-linguistic expressions might encode both conceptual and 
procedural meaning. In the case of expressives, this is a particularly pertinent 
point, for two reasons. Firstly, as was pointed out earlier, Wałaszeska (2004) and 
Padilla Cruz (2009ab) argue the case that interjections might, in fact, have some 
conceptual content. I find some of the arguments convincing, particularly the 
claim in Padilla Cruz that the grammaticalisation of an interjection might 
somehow be reflected in the fact that, over time, they become associated with 
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conceptual material. If this is right, then the showing-meaningNN distinction may 
well have diachronic applications of the kind discussed in the final chapter of 
Wharton (2009). Secondly, one of the aims of Blakemore (2013) is to argue 
against a unified account of expressive meaning. One of her motivations for 
doing so is the fact that in the account of racial epithets she offers their 
expressive effects are achieved ‘via the encyclopedic assumptions associated 
with the concepts they are understood to communicate (2013: 33 – my italics). 
My hunch is that we do want a unified account of expressive meaning and the 
suggestion that words might be able to tap in to both concepts and procedures 
may be one way of achieving this. The procedural account of interjections offered 
in Wharton (2003a) and the conceptual one proposed by Padilla Cruz and 
Wałaszeska might both be on the right track. 
 
7. Showing and meaningNN revisited 
As we saw in §5, one way in which the more natural elements of communication 
can be accommodated within a theory of utterance interpretation is by 
broadening the theory’s domain to include those cases of intentional 
communication that are not, strictly speaking, cases of Gricean meaningNN. Of 
course, an alternative approach would be to maintain Grice’s definition and 
exclude spontaneous expressions of emotion from the domain of pragmatic 
theory. This, effectively, is the approach adopted by Bach (2006: 494) in his 
review of Potts (2005): 
To implicate something entails meaning it, that is, intending to convey it to one’s 
audience. Presumably what is meant is a proposition, something that anybody can 
entertain or believe. But [ …] if I say, ‘That blasted TV isn’t working’, what do I mean 
in addition to the TV isn’t working? Is it something that my audience can agree with? 
[…] I do not mean ANYTHING in using blasted, although I can express a certain 
negative feeling towards my TV. Although my audience can recognize that I am 
expressing this feeling, in using blasted I do not MEAN that I have this feeling. I am 
expressing that feeling, not implicating it.  
Blakemore (2013: 9-10) quotes the same paragraph, remarking: 
In this paper, I do wish to take the analogy between expressives such as damn and 
blasted and non-verbal behaviour seriously. However, in contrast with Bach (2006), I 
do not accept that the fact that an utterance of blast or blasted is a case of showing or 
display, analogous to frowning or thumping the table, means that it should be 
excluded from cases in which one means or intends to convey something to one’s 
audience. 
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A degree of unpacking is necessary here. Firstly, as we have seen, Bach is not 
right that Grice’s framework excludes all expressions of emotion from meaning. 
Grice was quite happy for deliberate frowns to meanNN something. As was earlier 
remarked about Potts’ account, however, an account of expressives that deals 
only with non-spontaneous stimuli is surely missing something. Equally, we 
should not forget that expressive meaning may sometimes not serve a 
communicative function at all.  Swee and Schirmer (2015) perform a series of 
experiments which show that uttering ow when your hand is in painfully cold 
water can actually improve pain tolerance: the cathartic nature of expressives 
should not be overlooked. 
But secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we have seen in §6 that even if it 
were true that such an expressive utterance was excluded from cases of 
meaningNN, it would certainly not follow that it would be excluded from cases in 
which ‘one intends to convey something to one’s audience’ (see the Blakemore 
quote above). As we have seen, cases of meaningNN are just one sub-type of 
cases of intending to convey something to an audience, albeit a sub-type that 
has to fit a set of very strict criteria. While many instances of ostensive behaviour 
fail to meet these criteria, it does not follow that they fail to be instances of overt 
intentional communication more broadly construed. An alternative to arguing 
against Bach’s view that expressives don’t mean anything, then, would be to 
respond that if they don’t, then the problem lies not with expressives but with the 
notion of meaning itself. This is the solution adopted by relevance theory. 
 
8. Conclusion 
About 90% of the volume and mass of an iceberg lies submerged beneath the 
surface. Sailors learned that the hard way. Semanticists continue to focus on 
truth-conditional meaning and pragmatists, by and large, continue to focus on 
non-natural meaningNN. But, as this paper has tried to show, that is to miss a 
lot. Broadening the domain of pragmatics in the way I have suggested, may 
lead us to a deeper understanding of not just intentional communication, but 
also other means of self-expression. 
 
I have argued in the past, for example, that the kind of ‘meaning’ inherent in 
music is more to do with showing than meaning (Wharton 2011). And there is 
now a rich, and burgeoning literature from researchers interested in how 
expression and interpretation in the artistic sense might be dealt with in 
cognitive terms (Macmahon 2001; Bateman 2009; Pignocchi 2009; Wildgen 
2009; Furlong 2014; Jucker and Barrett 2011; Oliviera 2013; Kolaiti 2015; 
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Mitchell 2015). 
 
Why does the music of Les Mystères des Voix Bulgares resonate within me 
so strongly? Why does Monet’s Antibes make me warm inside? Why do the 
following few lines from Seamus Heaney’s description of freshwater perch 
(2001: 4) set me free? 
 
Guzzling under the current, against it, all muscle and slur 
In the finland of perch, the fenland of alder, on air 
 
That is water, on carpets of Bann stream, on hold 
In the everything flows and steady go of the world. 
 
But ‘resonance’, ‘warmth’ and ‘freedom’, as used here, are metaphors. 
Because, when it comes to words, metaphors are all we have. There are no 
words to describe what music, painting and poetry communicate to us. As 
William Burroughs (1965) once put it: ‘…words are an around-the-world, 
oxcart way of doing things, awkward instruments, and they will be laid aside 
eventually, probably sooner than we think.’ 
 
 
* 
In this paper I have attempted to build on previous accounts of expressive 
meaning paying particular attention to work I have done over the past ten years 
or so and work by Diane Blakemore. A thread running through the whole paper 
has been the three properties expressives share: (i) their non-truth conditionality 
and hence their independence from the proposition expressed; (ii) their 
descriptive ineffability;  (iii) the way they parallel with non-verbal behaviours. The 
discussion has attempted to take these properties into account. I asked two 
questions. Firstly, what is the relationship between the procedural meaning in 
Blakemore’s account of expressives and the kind encoded by discourse 
connectives? Secondly, to what extent do we want to say that expressives mean 
anything at all? 
 
In answering both questions, the iceberg metaphor is again apposite. Regarding 
the first question, and as I discussed in the first paragraph of §6, procedural 
meaning was conceived to deal with non-truth-conditional discourse connectives. 
It has subsequently been applied to pronouns, discourse particles, mood 
indicators, interjections, prosody, facial expressions, natural codes of all kinds 
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and even emotions. As it is construed in the current paper, procedural meaning is 
far away from that original conception. In Wharton and Wilson (2006), we put it 
like this (embracing a suggestion made by Dan Sperber): 
The function of… ‘procedural’ expressions would be to facilitate the identification 
 of the speaker’s meaning by narrowing the search space for inferential 
 comprehension, increasing the salience of some hypotheses and eliminating 
 others, thus reducing the overall effort required. Following a suggestion of Dan 
 Sperber (p.c.), such expressions might be described as encoding meta-
 procedures, which manage the accessibility or activation levels of the regular 
 relevance-oriented procedures for perception, memory retrieval or inference. 
If cognition crucially involves a set of procedures (or programs, to use Cosmides 
and Tooby’s terminology), then those elements of procedural meaning first 
identified in Blakemore (1987) are meta-procedures that are parasitic on them. It 
is by chance that we found them first. 
Turning to the second question, in any given communicative exchange it is 
probably true that as much is shown as it is meant: indeed, in a sense it is all 
shown, since relevance theorists dispense with the philosophical term ‘meaning’ 
and see those cases that satisfy Grice’s definition as simply special cases of 
showing, or ostension. To conceptualise ostension and the vaguer aspects of 
communication, Sperber and Wilson (forthcoming) develop the showing-
meaningNN distinction and augment it with a separate, orthogonal dimension, 
which allows them to accommodate the fact that what is shown or meantNN might 
be more or less determinate. They conclude that linguists, philosophers and 
pragmatists have, up to now at least, focused all their attention on cases that 
congregate in one corner of the square formed by the two axes: determinate 
meaningNN. The vaguer aspects of communication – the communication of 
impressions and ‘meanings’ that are descriptively ineffable – have been largely 
left untouched. This needs to change. 
And returning finally to the class of expressives, and – indeed – the title of this 
paper, a point developed in Blakemore (2013) is that while the literature on 
expressive epithets, for example, tends to focus on those noun phrases that 
express negative feelings, there exist epithets that are linked to the 
expression of positive feelings, such as ‘the poppet’ and ‘the sweetie’. There 
are also probably cases in which a speaker uses an expressive phrase such 
as ‘that bloody so-and-so’ which, while on the face of it is highly negative, the 
speaker implicitly dissociates themselves from any negative interpretation 
and, instead, is merely being playful, conveying affection, even love. Such 
cases, however, are extremely rare and I will not discuss them here. 
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